some sections just touch the surface, but the intention is to provide a full picture of the world of the open source BMC ecosystem, starting with a brief overview of the BMC's role in a system, touching on security concerns around the BMC, and then diving into some of the projects that have developed in the open source ecosystem.
If the CPU is the brain of the board, the BMC is the brain stem. It monitors and manages the physical state of a computer or hardware device. This state includes temperature, humidity, power supply voltage, fan speeds, remote access, and operating system functions. The BMC has historically been a SuperH or ARM-based system on a chip (SoC) with common functionality including but not limited to: ˲ RMII (reduced media-independent interface) and RGMII (reduced gigabit media-independent interface) for ethernet. ˲ A boot flash with an SPI (serial peripheral interface) NOR. (NOR and NAND are types of nonvolatile flash memory; the difference is in the type of logic gate used.) ˲ PCI (peripheral component interconnect) express. ˲ An LPC (low pin count) bus for communicating with the host. Intel's successor to LPC is the eSPI (Enhanced Serial Peripheral Interface bus).
The BMC usually communicates to the outside world (or the datacenter control network) using the intelligent platform management interface (IPMI), If the CPU is the brain of the board, the BMC is the brain stem.
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a message-based, hardware-level interface specification for managing and operating computer systems. It operates independently of the operating system, the server's CPU, and the firmware that allows admins to manage a system without an operating system or any system management software. Admins can also take advantage of IPMI's local network to get a console on a remote computer that is otherwise inaccessible.
BMC Security Concerns
The IPMI stack was not designed with security in mind (the IPMI spec requires making the hash of a user's password available over the stack). The assumption was the datacenter control networks would be segregated and trusted, which is why IPMI is notorious for security vulnerabilities. 2 Exploits in the IPMI stack and the BMC are devastating because of the many privileged operations for which they are responsible. Improving IPMI security has historically been neglected, as most IPMI software is proprietary.
The BMC has its own problems with largely proprietary software and vulnerabilities. The most recent notable BMC vulnerability is USBAnywhere, 3 discovered by Rick Altherr, principal engineer at Eclypsium. On Supermicro servers, an attacker can use USBAnywhere to connect remotely to a server and virtually mount any USB device to the server. As a result, an attacker could load a new operating system image or implant a firmware backdoor to facili-tate ongoing remote access. At the time of the disclosure, 47,000 vulnerable systems were found to be exposed to the public Internet. Another fun vulnerability is Pantsdown, 1 which allows read and write access to the BMC's address space from the host. Pantsdown is an example of a requested feature causing a vulnerability.
But wait, it gets worse. As Trammell Hudson pointed out in his Modchips of the State talk at the 35 th Chaos Communication Congress in 2018, 7 the BMC often has access to the host firmware via serial peripheral interface (SPI) and to host memory through direct memory access (DMA). The BMC gets DMA access because it is on the peripheral component interconnect express (PCIe) bus as a device. This means it can inject code into the host's firmware. Much BMC firmware also lacks the notion of a secure boot. This makes the BMC a prime target for hackers. Here, I emphasize a point I made in a previous article on open source firmware: 5 It's an alarming problem that the code running with the most privilege has the least visibility and inspectability.
The BMC Becomes Open Source
The trend toward open sourcing the datacenter has led to a number of innovative BMC projects.
OpenBMC. In 2014, Facebook decided to solve the problems with proprietary BMC software by starting an open source BMC software project. 4 In 2015, IBM and Rackspace collaborated on solving the same problems with their own project. 9 Both projects were called OpenBMC and ended up merging into the OpenBMC project the firmware community is familiar with today (https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc). The founding organizations of the OpenBMC project, post-merger, were Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Google, and Facebook. Open-BMC has the widest range of support for various BMCs.
The OpenBMC project encompasses u-boot, an open source boot-loader that boots a Linux kernel with a minimal root file system containing all the tools and binaries needed to run OpenBMC. OpenBMC is designed with a service-oriented approach. Services are started and maintained by systemd and communicate with each other over dbus. Designing for services makes sense as an easy way for multiple collaborators and vendors to contribute to a single BMC implementation. This allows each vendor contributing to the codebase to have separate daemons it can turn on to ship in its specific distribution of OpenBMC; however, it also makes the BMC software more complex to debug, audit, and put into production.
U-bmc. After OpenBMC came u-bmc (https://github.com/u-root/u-bmc), a software project started by Christian Svensson of Google. Written in Go, u-bmc aims for a more minimal BMC software architecture, challenging the status quo by replacing IPMI with gRPC. Removing IPMI makes u-bmc provocative from a security perspective since the attack surface area is reduced. Unlike Open-BMC, u-bmc boots a Linux kernel directly from the ASPEED startup code and more can be expected. This space is turning out many awesome projects, and I am lucky to be able to shine a light on the amazing work being done. Open sourcing the software at the lowest levels of the stack provides visibility into the code running with the most privileges on systems. We can only hope this will lead to more eyes vetting the code, encourage more minimal architectures, and lessen the risk of systems being caught with their "Pantsdown" in the future.
